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Abstract  
 
 
We model entry by entrepreneurs into new markets in developing economies with 
regulatory barriers in the form of licence fees and bureaucratic delay. Because laissez 
faire leads to ‘excessive’ entry, a licence fee can increase welfare by discouraging 
entry. However, in the presence of a licence fee, bureaucratic delay creates a strategic 
opportunity, which can result in both greater entry by first movers and a higher 
steady-state number of firms. Delay also leads to speculation, with entrepreneurs 
taking out licences to obtain the option of immediate entry if they later observe the 
industry to be profitable enough. 
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Since Schumpeter (1934) a substantial theoretical and empirical literature has
emerged to analyse the process of new ﬁrm entry in developed economies (Jo-
vanovic, 1982; Evans, 1987; Dunn, Roberts and Samuelson, 1989; and Ericson and
Pakes 1995).1 However, while the signiﬁcance of entry for developing economies
is recognized (Tybout, 2000), there has been little formal modeling of the issues
relating to entry in these economies, and of the associated problems posed by their
weaker institutional structures. In this paper we analyze the process of entry into
an entirely new industry in a developing economy, focusing on the impact for wel-
fare of regulatory intervention. Our model builds on the work of Hausmann and
Rodrik (2003), who explore how small open economies learn about what they are
good at producing. We ﬁnd that the appropriate policy for enhancing entry rates
is more complex than simply to ensure the operation of ‘good institutions.’ The
factors inhibiting entry work in subtle ways, and, in particular, the interactions
between early and later entrants need to be taken into account.
Since de Soto (1990), it has been argued that regulatory entry barriers are a
major factor causing low entry rates in developing economies, with negative im-
plications for output and employment growth (see Roberts and Tybout, 1996, and
Tybout, 2000). Djankov et al. (2002) provide comparative data on the regulations
1 See also Geroski (1995) and Caves (1998).
1aﬀecting entry in 85 countries. These include the number of procedures required
to start a ﬁrm (which, between countries, varies from 2 to 21), the minimum time
for start up (from 2 to 152 days), and the oﬃcial cost (from 0.5% to 560% of
per capita GDP). The average costs of entry are found to be rather high in most
countries, and countries with heavier entry regulations are found to have larger
unoﬃcial economies and higher levels of corruption.
T h e r ei sa l s oe v i d e n c et h a te n t r yr e g u l a t i o n sh a v ean e g a t i v ee ﬀect on the rate
of formation of new enterprises. Scarpetta et al. (2002) ﬁnd that the rate of entry
of small and medium enterprises is negatively related to the number of regulations,
especially those in the product and labour markets (see also Desai, Gompers and
Lerner, 2003). Klapper, Laeven and Rajan( 2 0 0 4 )e x p l o r et h ei m p a c to ne n t r yb a r -
riers by looking at the interactions between country-speciﬁc and industry-speciﬁc
variables. The main country characteristic used in the regressions is the cost of
fulﬁlling bureaucratic requirements to register a company. They ﬁnd that, for in-
dustries with high entry rates in the US, relative entry is disproportionately lower
in countries in which entry costs are higher. They conclude that entry regulations
do hinder entry, especially in industries that should ‘naturally’ have higher rates
of entry.
Our model addresses the initial level of entry by entrepreneurs into the new
industry in a developing economy and the steady-state solution obtaining after
2any subsequent entry or exit. We examine regulatory intervention in the forms
of a licence fee and of bureaucratic delay. Such interventions are not uniformly
damaging; for example, the imposition of a small licence fee is found to raise welfare
because it discourages entry. A delay between the application for a licence and
its receipt can increase the number of entrants, because of the strategic advantage
derived from early entry. After specifying the characteristics of a new industry in
Section 2, we go on in Section 3 to examine the benchmark case of socially optimal
pattern of entry and exit in a developing economy. In Section 4 we consider the
free-market solution with and without licence fees, the latter being denoted ‘laissez
faire.’ When the fee is zero, entry is found to be excessive because each entrant
ignores that its entry involves unnecessary duplication of sunk learning costs. Since
an entry barrier in the form of a licence fee has a negative eﬀe c to nb o t hi n i t i a l
entry and the steady-state number of ﬁrms, a suﬃciently small licence fee actually
raises welfare. However, because it is a single policy tool, it cannot induce both
socially optimal initial entry and the socially optimal steady-state number of ﬁrms
simultaneously. We also ﬁnd that weaker property rights, if associated with greater
spillovers, can eventually lead to more entry and a higher level of production.
In Section 5 we introduce a time lag between the payment of a licence fee and
the granting of a licence. We show that, in equilibrium, entrepreneurs choose to
divide into three groups. One group pays the fee immediately, entering after the
3required lag, while a second group never buys the licence. Those in the third group
choose to ‘speculate’ on a licence, buying the licence early, before the proﬁtability
of early entrants is revealed. Depending on the level of proﬁtability that is later
revealed, some or all of the speculators may enter without further delay, while
any remaining speculators never enter. Interestingly, the option of speculation
causes entrepreneurs to eschew delaying the decision as to whether to purchase a
licence until proﬁtability is revealed. Thus, our model provides a rationale for the
phenomenon of more licences being issued (even with a positive cost) than ﬁrms
entering. If the entry fee is small, the existence of delay raises the number of initial
entrants because of the strategic advantage they are given over later entrants. If
the entry fee is large enough, however, entry by ﬁrst movers is discouraged. Section
6 concludes.
2T h e I n d u s t r y
We model the process of entry in a developing economy, whose characteristics are
described primarily in terms of factor supply constraints and institutional deﬁcien-
cies relative to more developed economies. This is because we assume that, while
innovation in developing countries will typically be through the imitation of exist-
ing production methods in developed economies, such technology is not common
knowledge. Rather, the transfer of technology to new economic and institutional
4environments requires adaptations, and there is an associated uncertainty about
the future of proﬁtability of the new ventures (see Hausmann and Rodrik, 2003).
Hence entrepreneurs set up ﬁrms in a particular ‘new’ industry, the proﬁtability
of which is initially unknown.
We therefore consider a new modern-sector industry, with no incumbent ﬁrms
at time t =0 . Any entrepreneur may innovate, setting up a ﬁrm to enter the
industry and produce at t =1 . Though information on the supply of entrepre-
neurs is limited, studies of self-employment and latent entrepreneurship (see, e.g.,
Blanchﬂower, Oswald and Stutzer, 2001) do not suggest that entrepreneurship is
a function of income per capita (see also Casson et al., 2006). Thus, the supply of
potential entrepreneurs is assumed large relative to the number that actually set
up ﬁrms in the industry in equilibrium.2 Entrepreneurs (and ﬁrms) are indexed
i =1 ,2,...
E n t r yb ye n t r e p r e n e u ri at t =1requires a sunk cost k in learning and setting
up in the industry. As is common in developing economies (see Djankov et al.,
2002), it also requires the payment of a fee f ≥ 0 for a licence. If k and f are
incurred at t =1 ,t h eﬁrm will also need to employ a unit of skilled labour in any
2 At any time t there are more potential entrants than the market can sustain. The question
therefore arises of how the entry of only some of these potential entrants is co-ordinated. We
assume that there is some small exogenous asymmetry between potential entrants that allows
entry to take place only up to the point at which the present value of the expected proﬁts t r e a m
for the marginal entrant is zero. An alternative approach would be to model a mixed-strategy
equilibrium, but this would add complexity, and Levin and Peck (2003) have shown that this
approach can generate some rather implausible results.
5period t in order to produce. The output of any active ﬁrm i at time t is
y
i
t = θ + βnt, β ≥ 0, t =1 ,2,... (1)
At t =1 , θ is stochastic, being uniform over [0,2Θ]; but, given that at least one
entrepreneur sinks the learning cost k at t =1 , the value of θ becomes common
knowledge at t =2 . In conjunction with the other parameter values, θ represents
the proﬁtability of the industry in the country concerned. θ captures the idea
that, although the industry may exist in other countries, its suitability to local
conditions and institutions can only be discovered by experimentation. Note that
θ is not ﬁrm-speciﬁc. Unlike in Jovanovic (1982) or Ericson and Pakes (1995),
entrepreneurs do not learn about their own abilities; rather, they learn about their
environment.
Apart from θ at t =1 , the values of all variables and parameters in the model
are common knowledge. The total number of ﬁrms in the industry at t is denoted
by nt,a n dβ is a parameter. The term βnt is included to allow for a network ex-
ternality, which is increasing in the number of ﬁrms in the industry. For simplicity,
output demand is assumed perfectly elastic. Output price is ﬁxed at unity, and so
yt can also be interpreted as revenue.
In our model, the new industry is assumed to employ only skilled labour, and
we represent supply constraints by an increasing supply price. The wage for this
6labour, wt p e ru n i ta tt i m et,i s
wt = δ + αnt,δ , α > 0,t =1 ,2,... (2)
For stability, we assume that α − β ≡ Ω > 0.
Any number of entrepreneurs can enter the industry at any time. For a ﬁrst
mover (that is, an entrant at t =1 ) θ is stochastic. Then, for a potential second
mover (that is, an entrant at t =2 )t h ev a l u eo fθ is known. We assume, however,
that although the production function (1), including the value of θ, can be observed
by a second mover, methods of production can be only partially observed. A
second mover must therefore sink the learning/set-up cost (1 − γ)k,w h e r e0 ≥
γ ≥ 1 is the spillover from the knowledge that a ﬁrst mover acquires at t =1 .
These observations concerning second movers also apply to potential entrants at
t =3 ,4,...
Since no information becomes available after θ is revealed at the beginning of
t =2 , there will be no reason for a ﬁrm to prefer to enter or exit in later periods,
rather than at the beginning of t =2 . Therefore, for t ≥ 3, nt = n2, yi
t = yi
2,a n d
wt = w2.W r i t i n gπi
t and π
j
t for the respective proﬁts at time t of a ﬁrst mover i
7and a second mover j,w eh a v e
π
i
1 = θ − δ − Ωn1 − k − f; π
i
t = θ − δ − Ωn2, t =2 ,3,...;
π
j
2 = θ − δ − Ωn2 − (1 − γ)k − f; π
j
t = θ − δ − Ωn2, t =3 ,4,... (3)
The present value, at t =2 ,o fﬁrst mover i’s proﬁt stream, if it stays in production,
is
V
i
2 =
1
1 − σ
(θ − δ − Ωn2),( 4 )
where σ ∈ (0,1) is a discount factor. The present value, at t =2 , of second mover
j’s proﬁts t r e a mi s
V
j
2 =
1
1 − σ
(θ − δ − Ωn2) − K,( 5 )
where
K ≡ (1 − γ)k + f.( 6 )
In each case that follows, we examine the entry by ﬁrst movers, the subsequent
pattern of entry and exit, and the steady-state number of ﬁrms n∗ in the industry,
which is the number of ﬁrms that enter, but do not exit (i.e., the number of ﬁrms
in the industry at t =2 ,3,...).
83 The Social Optimum
Since output demand is perfectly elastic, we measure social welfare by the expected
present value of the aggregate proﬁt stream when the licence fee f set at zero. Since
there is no uncertainty after the value of θ is revealed (between t =1and t =2 ) ,
the optimum number of ﬁrms is the same at t =3 ,4,... as at t =2 . Hence, we
consider only the socially optimal values of n1 and n2, and we solve the model by
backward induction. At t =2 , n2 is chosen to maximize the present value V2 of
t h ea g g r e g a t ep r o ﬁt stream, given the realization of θ. Taking this into account,
at t =1 , n1 is chosen to maximize the present value, V2, of the expected aggregate
proﬁts t r e a m .
At t =2the number of entrants n1 from t =1is given. Let n0
1 denote the
number of ﬁrst movers (entrants at t =1 )that stay in production at t =2 ,3,...
and let m2 denote the number of second movers (new entrants at t =2 ) .T h e
socially optimal behaviour at t =2depends on the realization of θ. From (4) and
(5), the present value, at t =2 , of the aggregate proﬁt stream, with f =0 ,i s
n
0
1V
i
2 + m2V
j
2 ≡ V2 =
1
1 − σ
(n
0
1 + m2)[θ − δ − Ω(n
0
1 + m2)] − (1 − γ)km2.( 7 )
At t =2 , n0
1 and m2 are chosen to maximize V2.
9From (7), dV2/dm2 for n0
1 = n1 is given by3
µ
dV2
dm2
¶
n0
1=n1
=
1
1 − σ
[θ − δ − 2Ω(n1 + m2)] − (1 − γ)k.( 8 )
This is equal to zero, for zero entry m2 at t =2 , if
θ = δ +2 Ωn1 +( 1− σ)(1 − γ)k ≡ ˜ θ(n1).( 9 )
If θ>˜ θ(n1),t h e nV2 is raised by entry at t =2 .Ap o s i t i v ev a l u eo fm2 should be
set such that dV2/dm2 =0for n0
1 = n1;t h a ti s ,f r o m( 8 ) ,
n2 = n1 + m2 =
1
2Ω
[θ − δ − (1 − σ)(1 − γ)k]. (10)
However, if θ ≤ ˜ θ(n1), m2 should be zero: there should be no entry by second
movers. In this case we must consider how much exit, if any, there should be by
ﬁrst movers.
Note from (7) that, setting m2 =0a n dt h e nd i ﬀerentiating, dV2/dn0
1 =0if
θ =2 Ωn1 + δ ≡ θ
0(n1).( 1 1 )
If θ ≥ θ
0(n1), there will be no exit in the socially optimal solution. Hence, for
3 Throughout, we approximate by treating the number of ﬁr m sa sc o n t i n u o u s .
10˜ θ(n1) ≥ θ ≥ θ
0(n1), the social optimal number of ﬁrms at t =2is n1.B u t i f
θ<θ
0(n1),t h e r ew i l lb ee x i t ,a n d ,p r o v i d e dθ ≥ δ,t h en u m b e ro fs u r v i v o r sn0
1 will
satisfy (11); that is,
n
0
1 =
θ − δ
2Ω
≡ ˜ n
0
1. (12)
In this case the amount of exit will be n1 − ˜ n0
1.
Finally, if θ<δall n1 ﬁr s tm o v e r sw i l le x i ta tt =2 , and there will be no
further entry.
We now derive the socially optimal entry of ﬁrms at t =1 ,t a k i n gi n t oa c c o u n t
what we have found about socially optimal behaviour at t =2 .L e tV1 denote the
present value, at t =1 , of the aggregate expected proﬁt stream, and assume, for
now, that ˜ θ(n1) < 2Θ.T h e n V1 can be split into four components. The ﬁrst is
the aggregate proﬁte a r n e di nt =1by the n1 ﬁrst movers, and the other three
components relate to expected proﬁts at t =2 ,3,...for each of the three ranges of
θ speciﬁed in the previous sub-section. Thus, we obtain
2ΘV1 = n1
Z 2Θ
0
(θ − δ − Ωn1 − k)dθ +
Z 2Θ
˜ θ
½
σ
1 − σ
[θ − δ − Ω(n1 + m2)](n1 + m2) − σ(1 − γ)km2
¾
dθ +
σn1
1 − σ
Z ˜ θ
θ0
(θ − δ − Ωn1)dθ +
σ˜ n0
1
1 − σ
Z θ0
δ
(θ − δ − Ω˜ n
0
1)dθ. (13)
11Let n
opt
1 denote the value of n1 at which dV1/dn1 =0 . From (13), it is found that
n
opt
1 =
Θ{Θ − δ − [1 − σ(1 − γ)]k} − σ(1 − γ)k
£
3
4δ + 1
2(1 − γ)(1 − σ)k
¤
£
2Θ + 3
2σ(1 − γ)k
¤
Ω
.( 1 4 )
Since dV 2
1 /dn2
1 < 0, n1 = n
opt
1 is socially optimal. Note that n
opt
1 is increasing in Θ,
and decreasing in δ, k,a n dΩ, while dn
opt
1 /dσ and dn
opt
1 /dγ may take either sign.
We rest our analysis on the assumption that n
opt
1 > 0, that is, with a benevolent
social planner, the industry would be started. A necessary condition for this
inequality to hold is that, in (14),
Θ − δ − [1 − σ(1 − γ)]k>0.( 1 5 )
This implies that in the range θ ∈ [0,2Θ] the higher values yield a positive right-
hand side of (10). Also, it implies that ˜ θ(n1) < 2Θ, as we have already assumed,
the range covered by the second integral in (13) being positive.4 If the value of Θ
is reduced, the inequality ˜ θ(n1) < 2Θ is not violated because the value of n
opt
1 falls
suﬃciently quickly.
Figure 1 depicts this solution. The value of θ i ss h o w no nt h eh o r i z o n t a l
4 Setting n1 = n∗
1,w eo b t a i n2Θ − ˜ θ(n1)=( 2 Θ2 + z)/[2Θ +3 σ(1 − γ)k/2],w h e r ez =
Θk[3σ(1 − γ)/2+γ] − σ(1 − σ)k2(1 − γ)2/4. Thus, suﬃcient for 2Θ − ˜ θ(n1) > 0 is that z ≥ 0,
i.e., Θ/k ≥
£
σ(1 − σ)k2(1 − γ)2/4
¤
/[3σ(1 − γ)/2+γ]. But, from (14), given that n∗
1 > 0,w e
have that Θ−δ−[1 − σ(1 − γ)]k>0, i.e., that Θ/k > 1−σ(1−γ). Combining these inequalities,
suﬃcient for 2Θ − ˜ θ(n1) > 0 is that 1 − σ(1 − γ) ≥
£
σ(1 − σ)k2(1 − γ)2/4
¤
/[3σ(1 − γ)/2+γ],
which reduces to σ(1 − γ)[3− (1 − γ)(5σ − 1)/2] + 2γ[1 −σ(1 − γ)] ≥ 0. Since both terms [.] in
this inequality are positive, 2Θ − ˜ θ(n1) > 0.
12axis and the number of ﬁrms nt at time t on the vertical axis. The steady-state
number of ﬁrms in the social optimum, n∗opt,i ss h o w nb yt h et h i c kl i n es e g m e n t s .
Of the two upward-sloping segments, the one on the left is n1 =( θ − δ)/2Ω,t h e
value n∗opt would take if sunk cost K were zero,5 and the one on the right is
n1 =[ θ − δ −(1 −σ)(1 − γ)k]/2Ω,t h ev a l u en∗opt would take if sunk cost K were
(1−σ)(1−γ)k. The vertical diﬀerence between n∗opt and n
opt
1 for a given value of
θ is the amount of entry or exit at t =2 .
[Figure 1]
4 Market Equilibrium
We now assume that entrepreneurs make decisions freely about whether to enter
or exit. In this section we assume that although a licence may be required, there
is no delay in receiving it.
We solve the model by backward induction, and, again, since the solution is
the same at t =3 ,4,...as at t =2 ,w eb e g i nw i t ht =2 . We assume that parameter
values are such that there is positive entry at t =1in the solution.6
The value of n2 depends on the range of values within which θ falls. Four cases
5 Because at least one ﬁrm has to enter for our analysis to obtain, we start this line just above
the θ-axis.
6 As we shall see, this is implied by our assumption that n
opt
1 > 0.I f a l l ﬁrms ﬁnd it
unproﬁtable to enter at t =1 , they will also ﬁnd it unproﬁtable at t =2 , and the industry will
not be established.
13can be distinguished.
Case (a) All n1 ﬁrst movers would exit because even one of them alone in the
industry would make a loss at t =2 . From (3), this occurs if
θ<δ+ Ω ≡ θa.( 1 6 )
If (16) holds, all ﬁrst movers exit; and since second movers are at a cost disadvan-
tage relative to ﬁrst movers (still having to incur a set-up cost), there are is no
entry by second movers.
Case (b) In this range θ ≥ θa, and so some of the n1 ﬁrst movers remain in
the industry at t =2 , while some exit. If all n1 ﬁrst movers were to remain in the
industry the n1-th would make a loss, i.e., from (3),
θ<δ+ Ωn1 ≡ θb(n1).( 1 7 )
Thus, θ ∈ [θa,θ b). Because, at t =2 , a potential second mover is at a cost
disadvantage relative to any ﬁrst mover, there is no entry by second movers. The
number of ﬁrms n2 in this case is such that V i
2 =0 , so that, from (4),
n2 =
θ − δ
Ω
> 0 for θ ∈ (θa,θ b].( 1 8 )
Case (c) If θ ≥ θb all ﬁr s tm o v e r sr e m a i ni nt h ei n d u s t r ya tt =2 , but θ is not
14so great as to induce entry by second movers. From (5), V
j
2 is decreasing in n2.
Thus, if V
j
2 ≤ 0 for n2 = n1, there will be no second movers. This condition can
be written
θ ≤ δ + Ωn1 +( 1− σ)K ≡ θc(n1).( 1 9 )
When θ ∈ [θb,θ c), n2 is independent of parameter values.
Case (d) If θ ∈ (θc,2Θ] the ﬁrst movers will all remain in the industry at t =2
and there will be entry by second movers until V
j
2 =0 . Hence, from (5),
n2 =
1
Ω
[θ − δ − (1 − σ)K] ≡ ˆ n2.( 2 0 )
At t =1ﬁrm n1 is the marginal ﬁrm among those that enter. Writing π
n1
t for
its proﬁta tt i m et, and taking into account the four cases for possible draws of θ,
the expected present value of this ﬁrm’s proﬁts t r e a mi s
V
n1
1 (n1)=
1
2Θ
½Z 2Θ
0
π
n1
1 (n1)dθ +
σ
1 − σ
·Z θc
θb
π
n1
2 (n1)dθ +
Z 2Θ
θc
π
n1
2 (ˆ n2)dθ
¸¾
.
(21)
Here, the term in parentheses (.) after each π
n1
t denotes the number of ﬁrms in the
industry in the time period considered. The ﬁrst integral covers proﬁta tt =1 ,
while the second and third integrals relate to proﬁta tt =2in Cases (c) and (d)
respectively. (If Case (a) or (b) applied, ﬁrm n1 w o u l de x i t ,a n ds on ot e r mi s
15speciﬁed.) π
n1
1 (.) and π
n1
2 (.) are given by (4), while ˆ n2 is given by (20). Thus,
V
n1
1 (n1)=( Θ − δ − Ωn1 − k − f) −
1
4Θ
σ(1 − σ)K
2 + σK
µ
1 −
δ + Ωn1
2Θ
¶
.( 2 2 )
From (22), dV
n1
1 (n1)/dn1 < 0. n1 adjusts such that, in equilibrium, V
n1
1 (n1)=
0,t h es o l u t i o nb e i n gn1 =ˆ n1(f),w h e r e
ˆ n1(f)=
2Θ − δ
Ω
−
4Θ(Θ + k + f)+σ(1 − σ)K2
2Ω(2Θ + σK)
.( 2 3 )
From (20) and (23), we can ﬁnd, for Case (d), how many second movers will enter.
Denoting this number by ˆ m2(f)=ˆ n2(f) − ˆ n1(f),w eo b t a i n
ˆ m2(f)=
4Θ(θ − Θ + γk)+σK [2θ − (1 − σ)K]
2Ω(2Θ + σK)
for θ ∈ (θc,2Θ].( 2 4 )
Let n∗m(f) denote the steady-state number of ﬁrms in the market solution for
licence fee f.S i n c eb yt =2all uncertainty is resolved, n∗m(f)=n2.T h ev a l u e
of n∗m(f) depends on which of cases (a)-(d) obtains.
The eﬀects of variation in parameter values on ˆ n1(f) and n∗m(f) are easily
obtained. Since there are four cases of the latter, and, in general, the results
are intuitively as might be expected, for brevity, we do not discuss them.7 In
7 ˆ n1 is increasing in σ and β, and decreasing in α, δ, γ, k and f. In case (a) n∗m =0 .I nC a s e
(b) n∗m is increasing in β,d e c r e a s i n gi nα and δ, and independent of σ, γ, k and f .I nC a s e( c )
n∗m =ˆ n1.I nC a s e( d ) ,n∗m is increasing in σ, β and γ, and decreasing in α, δ, k and f.
16particular, dˆ n1(f)/df < 0 and, for n∗m(f) > 0, dn∗m(f)/df < 0, results that we
return to below. However, one other result is worth commenting on - the eﬀect of
variation in the spillover parameter γ. Using (6) and (20), we obtain the following
result.
Lemma 1 A higher value of the spillover parameter γ is associated with a smaller
entry of ﬁrst movers, but, provided θ is high enough for second movers to enter,
this eﬀect is more than outweighed (after a one-period lag) by the greater entry of
second movers.
This has the interesting implication that, if weaker property rights are asso-
ciated with greater levels of spillover, they will cause a lower level of entry ini-
tially, but competitive pressures can lead eventually to more entry in total, with a
larger number of new ﬁrms and a higher level of output. Pressures in developing
economies to strengthen intellectual property rights, for example via the World
Trade Organization, in so far as they aﬀect the level of spillovers in the domestic
market, may have the perverse eﬀect of reducing the total number of ﬁrms and
production.
174.1 Laissez Faire, Licences, and Sub-Optimality
Setting f =0 , we obtain the laissez-faire solution. From (23),
ˆ n1(0) =
Θ{Θ − δ − [1 − σ(1 − γ)]k} − σ(1 − γ)k
£
1
2δ + 1
4(1 − γ)(1 − σ)k
¤
[Θ + σ(1 − γ)k]Ω
.( 2 5 )
Comparing (25) with (14), it is immediately see that ˆ n1(0) exceeds n
opt
1 ,t h ee n t r y
at t =1in the social optimum.8
To compare the steady-state number of ﬁrms n∗m(f) for f =0with the social
optimum, we draw the diagram corresponding, for laissez faire, to Figure 1. This is
done in Figure 2, where the thick line depicts the laissez-faire case and the broken
line depicts the social optimum. Period-1 entry in the laissez-faire case is labelled
nm
1 (0). From (10) (12), (18) and (20), the slopes of the upward sloping portions
of n∗m(0) are half the slopes of the corresponding portions for n∗opt.W e c a n n o t
tell, unconditionally, whether each discontinuity for the laissez-faire line n∗m(0) is
to the left or right of of the corresponding discontinuity for the social optimum
n∗opt; but the critical features of the ﬁgure are that, for each line, for one ﬁrm to
stay in the industry we must have θ = δ + Ω,w h i l ef o ra n yθ greater than this,
n∗m(0) >n ∗opt.
[Figure 2]
8 From (25) and (14), if k =0laissez faire results in social optimal entry at t =1 . Similarly,
if k =0laissez faire results in optimal entry/exit at t =2 . Thus, it is the duplication of sunk
costs that leads to overentry in the text.
18Our ﬁrst proposition summarizes the main conclusions for laissez-faire.
Proposition 1 Laissez faire leads to excessive entry at t =1 : ˆ n1(0) >n
opt
1 ;a n d ,
provided θ>δ+ Ω, there is is an excessive number of ﬁrms in the laissez-faire
steady state (n∗m(0) >n ∗opt).
For n1 > 1, laissez-faire leads to excessive ﬁrst-mover entry and to too many
licences in the steady state because each entrepreneur fails to take into account
that he or she is sinking costs for learning to an extent that is unnecessary from a
social point of view.
Finally, we consider the eﬀect of the licence fee on the market solution; that is,
we compare the equilibrium for f =0with that for f>0.T h ee ﬀects are shown
in Figure 3, where the zero-licence fee case is shown by the broken line, and the
p o s i t i v e - l i c e n c ef e ec a s ei ss h o w nb yt h et h i c kl i n e .F r o m( 2 3 ) ,dˆ n1/df < 0, while
from (20), a greater f is associated with a lower n2 for θ ∈ (θc,2Θ];a l s o ,f r o m
(17) and (19), dθb/df < 0 and dθc/df < 0, respectively. However, from (18), if
θ<θ b, n2 is independent of the value of f: within this range of θ, n2 <n 1 and so
the value of n1 (which does depend on f)i si r r e l e v a n t ,a n df o rﬁrms making the
decision about whether to stay in the industry at t =2 , f is a by-gone. This gives
our the next lemma.
[Figure 3]
19Lemma 2 A positive licence fee reduces the number of ﬁrst movers and, for θ>
θb(ˆ n1), reduces the steady-state number of ﬁrms.
Since laissez faire is associated with excessive entry, the introduction of a pos-
itive licence fee can raise welfare.9 The level of f that maximizes social welfare,
subject to the constraint that entry is unregulated, can be derived, but the formula
is not simple enough to yield clear insights.10 However, as f is raised past this
optimal level, welfare falls along with entry.
5D e l a y a n d S p e c u l a t i o n
In the formulation above, the licence fee f plays almost the same role as the
learning cost k, the only diﬀerence being that while all ﬁr m sp a yt h es a m ef e e ,
the existence of a spillover causes second movers, though not ﬁrst movers, to pay
only a portion of k. We now suppose, however, that there is a one-period delay
between paying the licence fee and getting the licence. Thus, we suppose that ﬁrst
movers pay the licence fee at t =0and begin production at t =1 .A sa b o v e ,t h e
realization of θ is observed between t =1and t =2 . With this amendment to the
model, one possibility is for other ﬁrms to wait to observe the realization of θ and
then, if the realization is favourable, pay the fee f immediately. Thus, f would be
9 However, if k =0the introduction of a licence fee necessarily reduces welfare.
10 It is found that social optimal value of f satisﬁes £
2Θ(Θ + k + f − Ω)+σ(1 − σ)K2/2 − ˆ n1Ω
¤
dˆ n1/df − 2ˆ n1Θ =0 .
20paid at the beginning of t =2and then entry by second movers would occur at
the beginning of t =3 , with the learning cost (1 − γ)k then being incurred.
However, entry may take a diﬀerent form. An entrepreneur may decide to
‘speculate,’ applying for a licence, but not producing before the realization of θ,
and then only going into production if the realization is suﬃciently favourable.
Thus, the entrepreneur may pay the fee at the beginning of t =1 , and then either
b e g i np r o d u c t i o na tt h eb e g i n n i n go ft =2or not begin production at all. We
can therefore now distinguish three types of entry: by ﬁrst movers, by speculators
and by ‘later movers’ (entrepreneurs who wait to see the realization of θ before
possibly paying f).
At t =2a ﬁrst mover has a cost advantage (1−γ)k over a speculator, and so, if
a speculator enters, we know that all ﬁrst movers are remaining in the industry. At
t =2and t =3a speculator has the cost advantages of f and (1−γ)k over a later
mover, and so, if any later movers enter, we know that all speculators are staying
in. To solve the model, we begin by disregarding later movers entirely, considering
only ﬁrst movers and speculators. (We shall then show that no entrepreneurs will
choose to be later movers.)
Suppose that s1 entrepreneurs buy licences at t =1 . For any one of these
21speculators, h, if he or she then enters at t =2 ,p r o ﬁti s
π
h
2 = θ − δ − Ωn2 − (1 − γ)k;
π
h
t = θ − δ − Ωn3, t =3 ,4,... (26)
And, at t =2 , the present value of its proﬁts t r e a mi s
V
h
2 = θ − δ − Ωn2 − (1 − γ)k +
σ
1 − σ
(θ − δ − Ωn3).( 2 7 )
The number of speculators that then enter at t =2depends on what realization
of θ occurs. The realizations can be divided into three cases.
Case (SA) If θ is low enough, V h
2 < 0 for all h ∈ (n1,n 1 + s1],s ot h a tn o n eo f
the speculators enter. Since, at t =2 , a speculator has a cost disadvantage relative
to a ﬁrst-mover, the highest value of θ at which this case obtains is when all n1
ﬁrst movers would nonetheless remain in the industry. Hence, Case (SA) is deﬁned
by writing n2 = n3 = n1 in (27) and ﬁnding the values of θ for which V h
2 < 0, i.e.,
θ<δ+ Ωn1 +( 1− σ)(1 − γ)k ≡ θSA(n1).( 2 8 )
Case (SB) In this range (28) is violated, and some, but not all, s1 speculators
enter. If all speculators were to enter, the least eﬃcient would make a loss in
22present value terms; i.e., from (27),
θ<δ+ Ω(n1 + s1)+( 1− σ)(1 − γ)k ≡ θSB(n1).( 2 9 )
The number of ﬁrms adjusts such that in (27), V h
2 =0for h = n2, i.e.,
n2 =
1
Ω
[θ − δ − (1 − σ)(1 − γ)k] ≡ ˆ n
s
2.( 3 0 )
Case (SC) Here, all s1 speculators enter; i.e., (29) is violated.
Moving back to t =1 , we can now consider the payoﬀ from speculation. The
expected present value for the marginal speculator (the s1-th) is
V
s1
1 (n1 + s1)=−f +
σ
2Θ
Z 2Θ
θSB
·
π
n1+s1
2 (n1 + s1)+
σ
1 − σ
π
n1+s1
3 (n1 + s1)
¸
dθ.
The ﬁrst term in [.] is proﬁt including set-up cost (1−γ)k, while the second is the
stream of discounted proﬁts after the set-up cost has been incurred. Hence,
V
s1
1 (n1 + s1)=−f +
σ
Θ(1 − σ)
µ
Θ −
θSB
2
¶2
. (31)
From (29) and (31), dV
s1
1 (n1 + s1)/ds1 < 0. s1 adjusts such that, in equilibrium,
23V
s1
1 (n1 + s1)=0 , that is, (29) and (31),
n1 + s1 =
1
Ω
(
2Θ − δ − (1 − σ)(1 − γ)k − 2
·
Θ(1 − σ)f
σ
¸1
2
)
.( 3 2 )
The ranges of θ relevant to the behavior of a ﬁrst mover follow immediately
from the cases already speciﬁed in this and the previous section.
Case (Fa) All ﬁrst movers exit (and no speculators enter). They do this if
θ<θ a,a ss p e c i ﬁed in (16).
Case (Fb) Some, but not all, ﬁrst movers exit (and no speculators enter). This
occurs if θ ≥ θa,b u tθ<θ b(n1),a ss p e c i ﬁed in (17). Note that since the value
of n1 will now be diﬀerent to the value taken in the absence of delay, the value of
θb(n1) will also diﬀer. n2 is now given by (18).
Case (Fc) All ﬁrst movers stay in production, but still no speculators enter.
In this case θ ≥ θb(n1),b u tθ<θ SA(n1),w h e r eθSA(n1) is given by (28).
Case (Fd) All ﬁrst movers stay in production and some, but not all, speculators
enter. This occurs if θ ≥ θSA(n1), but θ<θ SB(n1),w h e r eθSB(n1) is given by
(29). n2 is now given by (30).
Case (Fe) All speculators enter. This happens if θ ≥ θSB(n1),t h en u m b e ro f
ﬁrms n1 + s1 being given by (32).
Given these ranges, the present value, measured from t =0 , of the expected
24proﬁt stream for the marginal ﬁrst mover is
V
n1
0 (n1)=−f +
σ
2Θ
Z 2Θ
0
π
n1
1 (n1)dθ +
σ2
1 − σ
1
2Θ
·Z θSA
θb
π
n1
2 (n1)dθ +
Z θSB
θSA
π
n1
2 (ˆ n
s
2)dθ +
Z 2Θ
θSB
π
n1
2 (n1 + s1)dθ
¸
,
where the proﬁt equations (3) apply, but with f deleted. The ﬁrst integral covers
proﬁta tt =1 ; the others cover proﬁta tt =2 ,3,... for Cases (Fc-Fe), i.e., when the
realization of θ is large enough for the marginal ﬁrst mover to stay in production.
We thus ﬁnd, after substituting from (32) to eliminate s1,t h a t
V
n1
0 (n1)=−(1 − σ)f + σ(Θ − δ − Ωn1 − k) −
1
4Θ
(1 − σ)[σ(1 − γ)k]
2
+σ
2(1 − γ)k
µ
1 −
δ + Ωn1
2Θ
¶
.( 3 3 )
From (33), dV
n1
0 (n1)/dn1 < 0. n1 adjusts so that V
n1
0 (n1)=0 ,t h es o l u t i o nb e i n g
n1 =ˆ ns
1, where, from (33),
ˆ n
s
1 =
2Θ − δ
Ω
−
4Θ[(Θ + k)+( 1− σ)f/σ]+( 1− σ)σ[K − f]
2
2Ω[2Θ + σ(K − f)]
.( 3 4 )
We now add the possibility of later entry into the model, while still allowing
for speculation. If entrepreneur j pays at t =2for a licence in order to begin
25production at t =3 , the present value of his or her proﬁts t r e a mi s
V
j
2 =
σ
1 − σ
(θ − δ − Ωn2) − σ(1 − γ)k − f.( 3 5 )
This parallels equation (5), but incorporates additional discounting because of the
time lag in receiving the licence. If θ were to be suﬃciently high for such late
entry to occur, an interior solution for the number of ﬁrms n3 at t =3would be
characterized by V
n3
2 =0 ; and hence,
n3 =
1
Ω
½
θ − δ − (1 − σ)
·
(1 − γ)k +
f
σ
¸¾
.( 3 6 )
However, n3 is the total number of ﬁrms in this case; that is, it includes the
ﬁrst movers and speculators, as well as later movers. Now compare (36) with
(30), which gives the total number of ﬁr m si nC a s e( S B ) ,i . e . ,w h e nt h em a r g i n a l
speculator does not enter, though some speculators do. Because of the appearance
of the term f/σ, n3 in (36) is less than n2 in (30). But when there is any late entry,
our assumptions imply that all ﬁrst movers have stayed in and all speculators have
entered. Thus, the total number of ﬁrst movers and speculators must be at least
as large as in (30). We have a contradiction: (36) could only apply if the number
of later movers were negative. The following lemma therefore obtains.11
11 The arguments in this section are based on licence delays when a positive fee exists. In the
absence of a fee f all ﬁrms would procure a licence at t =0and we would eﬀectively be back in
26Lemma 3 With a positive licence fee, if it is necessary to wait to be granted a
licence, there is no later entry.
The up-front payment of the entry fee by speculators gives them a strategic
advantage over later entrants. We can therefore disregard the possibility of later
entry when there is a delay in being granted a licence. The pattern of entry is
as depicted in Figure 4, where ns
1(f) is period-1 entry in the delay-case. The
pattern in Figure 4 has the same general shape as that in Figure 2, except in
one important respect. For θ ∈ [θSB(n1),2Θ], the line depicting the steady-state
number of ﬁrms n∗ is horizontal. This is because, for such high realizations of θ,
all the entrepreneurs that have speculatively bought a licence will enter, and, as
we have seen, the solution to the model is such that there is no entry by later
movers.
[Figure 4]
Finally, for f>0, we compare the solutions with and without delay. Given
Lemma 3, we compare (34) with (23) to obtain the following result for ﬁrst movers.
Proposition 2 There exists a critical value f = ¯ f(σ) such that ˆ ns
1 R ˆ n1 as f Q
¯ f(σ); i.e., for f<¯ f(σ) licence delay increases ﬁrst-mover entry, and vice versa.
Proof. From (23) and (34), using (6), we obtain 2Ω(2Θ + σK)[2Θ + σ(K −
f)](ˆ ns
1 − ˆ n1)/f = A − B,w h e r eA =2 Θ[2Θ(4σ − 2 − σ2)/σ − 2σγk + σ(1 − σ)(1
t h el a i s s e z - f a i r es o l u t i o n .
27−γ)k] and B =( 1− σ)K[(2 − σ)2Θ − σ2(1 − γ)k]. Using (15), B>0.H e n c e ,
u s i n g( 6 ) ,w eo b t a i nˆ ns
1 − ˆ n1 R 0 as f Q ¯ f(σ),w h e r e ¯ f(σ) ≡
{4Θ[Θ(4σ − 2 − σ2)/σ − σγk − (1 − σ)2(1 − γ)]k]+( 1− σ)[σ(1 − γ)k]2}/B
Delay beneﬁts ﬁrst movers in that potential competitors (speculators) pay the
fee for a licence that they may not use, and this limits their expected proﬁt. But
the cost to the potential ﬁrst mover is that it must itself wait, after payment for
the licence, before entry is possible. Because of the latter eﬀect, we ﬁnd that delay
induces greater ﬁrst-mover entry only if f is suﬃciently small. Indeed, we cannot
rule out the possibility that ¯ f(σ) < 0, in which case licence delay necessarily causes
smaller ﬁrst-mover entry.
Denoting the steady-state number of ﬁrms in the presence of licence delay by
n∗m(f), we can compare this with the corresponding number n∗m(f) without delay.
The relative size of these numbers depends on the realization of θ and on parameter
values, but we can make some comments by reference to Figure 4, where both are
shown. Starting from θ =0 , and then increasing θ, the steady state is at ﬁrst zero
in each case, and then the same upward-sloping lines apply; but then, since we
cannot determine, unconditionally, in which case there is higher ﬁrst-period entry,
we cannot tell which steady-state number is higher (we cannot tell in which case
the horizontal portion of the steady-state line in Figure 4 is higher; the ﬁgure is
merely an illustration). However, for the highest values of θ,p r o v i d e df is not so
28high as to prevent entry in the no-delay case, n∗m(f) >n ∗s(f),a sd r a w n . 12
6 Concluding Comments
Entry rates in developing economies are potentially high because numerous oppor-
tunities exist to close the technology gap with developed economies. We explore
these issues in a model in which regulatory barriers that are widely observed in
such economies - licence fees and bureaucratic delay - may in principle prevent
these opportunities from being exploited. We ﬁnd, however, that, because in this
environment laissez faire leads to ‘excessive’ entry, low levels of regulatory barriers
can in fact increase welfare. As the size of a licence fee is raised from zero, welfare
ﬁrst increases and then declines. We also note that, although weaker property
rights discourage innovative entry, if they lead to greater spillovers, they can raise
the number of ﬁrms in the steady state.
Whereas, in the absence of bureaucratic delay, a licence fee has a negative eﬀect
on both the number of ﬁrst movers and on the steady-state number of ﬁrms, the
combination of bureaucratic delay and a licence fee can have the opposite eﬀects.
This is because, although the time lag between application for and receipt of a
licence is assumed the same for all entrepreneurs, the delay changes the balance
of advantage between ﬁrst and later movers. Moreover, delay opens up the option
12 It is found that ˆ n2 in (20) is greater than n1 + s1 in (32) if 4Θ − σ(1 − σ)f>0.
29of speculative purchase of licences, not all of which are then used.
Empirical work on the impact of entry barriers (e.g., Djankov et al., 2002) has
tended to assume that all barriers have negative eﬀects on entry and that reduced
entry is bad for welfare. Our analysis suggests that both of these views are too
simplistic. There is evidence, however, that where bureaucratic delays are large,
the number of registered ﬁrms greatly exceeds the number of active ones (see,
for example, Aidis, 2005, on Russia). Our model provides an explanation of this
observation.
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